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The Thinking Animal Problem and Person Pronoun Revisionism 
HAROLD W. NOONAN 
In his book (2007) Eric Olson makes some criticisms of a response to the problem of the 
thinking animal (also called the ‘two many minds’ or ‘two many thinkers’ problem) 
which I have offered, on behalf of the neo-Lockean psychological continuity theorist. 
Olson calls my proposal ‘personal pronoun revisionism’ (though I am not suggesting any 
revision). In what follows I shall say what my proposal actually is, defend it and briefly 
respond to Olson’s criticism. 
 The problem of the thinking animal, briefly, is that it seems indisputable that 
human animals, i.e., human beings, or at least, all normal healthy adult human beings, are 
thinkers. But so, by definition are persons. However, according to the psychological 
continuity theorist of personal identity, persons are not human beings (they differ in their 
persistence conditions). So the psychological continuity theory entails the existence of 
too many thinkers. Moreover, it creates an irresoluble epistemic problem: how do I know 
I am the person sitting here typing this thinking truly that he is person and not the 
coincident human animal thinking falsely that he is a person? Finally, if human animals, 
in addition to persons, are thinkers, they must be persons after all, since their thoughts 
have whatever complexity and sophistication any ordinary definition of ‘person’ could 
require – they have just the same thoughts, after all, as the persons with whom on the 
psychological continuity account, they ‘cohabit’, so the neo-Lockean’s attempt to identify 
the persistence conditions for persons collapses into incoherence, since he has to 
acknowledge different kinds of person with different persistence conditions – as it were 
person-persons and animal-persons. 
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 My claims are: 
(a) that the most sensible thing for  the psychological continuity theorist  to do in 
response to the too many thinkers problem is (i) to distinguish the concepts of 
an object of first-person reference and a thinker of first-person thoughts and 
(ii) to say that when an  animal coincident with but distinct from a person is a 
thinker of a first-person thought, not he, but the coincident person, is the 
object of the thought 
(b) that this is not a reductio of the psychological continuity theory. 
 My argument is as follows: 
(1) Persons and only persons are objects of first-person reference 
I take this to be trivially analytic. If anything is a person it is capable of being an object of 
(its own) first-person reference and anything which is capable of being an object of first-
person reference is a person. (Sometimes, of course, we pretend that something which is 
not a person is an object of first-person reference. For example, I put a sign on my door 
saying ‘I am unlocked, please come in and wait’. Or the justifiably aggrieved (but rather 
bossy) Departmental Secretary puts a notice up in the lecturers’ coffee room, purporting 
to be from the ‘Cleaning Angel’, which reads ‘I do not exist. Wash up and dry your cups 
yourselves.’) 
(2) All persons are psychological continuers 
This is a formulation of the standard neo-Lockean view, I do not have to defend it here 
since I am only concerned to bring out its consequences. 
(3) Some normal healthy adult human animals are not psychological continuers 
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This is undisputed by neo-Lockeans, since it is an acknowledged fact of observation that 
all normal healthy adult human beings have had foetal stages to which they are not 
psychologically connected and some will have late vegetative stages to which they are 
not psychologically connected. 
(4) All normal healthy adult human animals are thinkers of true first-person 
thoughts 
This is what the animalist urges, rightly, I think, on the neo-Lockean as an evident 
common-sense truth. Some neo-Lockeans, notably Shoemaker, deny it. 
From (1)-(4) follows: 
(5) Some normal healthy adult human animals have first-person thoughts which 
are not about themselves but about psychological continuers with which they are 
not identical 
By (1) their first-person thoughts must be about persons. So by (2) they must be about 
psychological continuers. But if the human animals in question are among those that are 
not psychological continuers, whose existence is certified by (3), they cannot be thinking 
about themselves, but, by (4), some of their first-person thoughts are true, so must have 
referents – hence their referents must be psychological continuers distinct from 
themselves. 
 (5), then, I claim, is what the neo-Lockean, the defender of (2), must say on pain 
of denying a trivial analytic truth, (1), or a plain fact of observation, (3), or an evident 
common-sense truth, (4). 
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 But is this not a reductio of neo-Lockeanism? I do not think so. Olson makes 
much of the idea of what we mean by ‘person’ (and the plural term ‘people’) in the 
ordinary sense of the word. He writes: 
if something were psychologically indistinguishable from you … would you 
refuse to call it a person … until you were told whether it persists by virtue of 
psychological continuity? That seems no part of what we ordinarily mean by 
“person”. If human animals really are psychologically just like ourselves, they 
will count as people in any ordinary sense of the word…. Human animals may 
fail to satisfy some specialized philosophical sense of “person”, owing to having 
the wrong persistence conditions or on some other trivial grounds. But they are 
surely people in the sense that informs our ordinary use of personal pronouns 
(2007: 16) 
 It would not help me if I were to submit to Olson’s insistence that being a 
(sophisticated) thinker suffices for being a person (even in the case of something which is 
not an object of first-person reference), since then I would simply face a too many 
persons problem as well as a too many thinkers problem. But this is all beside the point. 
The debate to which the neo-Lockean intends to contribute is about two questions: ‘What 
am I (fundamentally)?’ and ‘What are my persistence conditions?’ The primary 
formulation of these questions is first-personal. The word ‘person’ as it is used in this 
debate (and its synonym ‘self’) is merely intended to allow a non-indexical formulation 
of these questions. So ‘person’ in the philosophical debate simply means object of first-
person reference. (1) is trivially true. (And for what it is worth, I think, would be so 
regarded by the man in the street (though I doubt that he would so regard the formulation 
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using ‘people’ in place of ‘persons’). So although he would not wait to call something a 
‘person’ until he knew whether it was a psychological continuer, he would hesitate to call 
something a ‘person’ if he believed it never referred to itself (at least in thought) in the 
first-person, ADD: AND WOULD NOT HESITATE TO CALL IT A PERSON IF HE 
BELIEVED IT WAS AN OBJECT OF FIRST-PERSON REFERENCE.) 
So the substantive point at issue is the neo-Lockean claim (2), which is the claim 
that (as a matter of conceptual necessity) objects of first-person reference are 
psychological continuers. Following out the consequences of this (given empirical facts 
and common-sense truth) leads to the surprising conclusion that there are more thinkers 
than common-sense acknowledges and that some of these are not objects of their first-
person reference (and so are thinkers that are not persons if we interpret ‘person’ one 
way, or are persons that are not objects of first-person reference if we interpret it another 
way). But it is hardly news that neo-Lockeanism leads to this unless, like Shoemaker’s 
version, it offends common-sense at a different point. Locke himself distinguished 
between thinking substances, which he thought were probably immaterial, and persons, 
and so had to acknowledge the existence of thinkers distinct from persons that were not 
objects of first-person reference – that is, could not think of ‘themselves as themselves’ in 
different times and places; he worried about their fate on the Great Day, when all hearts 
will be opened. Butler and Reid homed in on this duality of thinking substances and 
person in their critiques of Locke. And, of course, as Olson  acknowledges, the four-
dimensional version of the psychological continuity account endorses a multiplicity of 
thinkers that are not objects of first-person reference and requires what Olson calls 
personal pronoun revisionism. Anyway animalism has its own conflicts with common-
 6 
sense: in the restricted ontology it endorses, its denial of the transplant intuition, and its 
acceptance of the consequence that if your brainstem is replaced by an inorganic 
substance gradually, bit by bit (Olson 1999:141), without  interruption of consciousness 
throughout, or your cerebrum removed for transplantation, the result is a new rational 
conscious being, which is not a human being, or else  a series of thoughts and sensations 
that are not the thoughts of anyone (Olson 1999:141-2).
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 (It should be noted also that the 
too many thinkers problem also arises in the case of non-human animals. The transplant 
intuition is as strong in the case of dogs as it is in the case of human beings and it is as 
obvious that dogs think as that men do. So someone who endorses the transplant intuition 
in this case also faces the problem of too many thinkers. But what Olson calls the 
epistemic problem and the personhood problem do not arise since dogs are not self-
conscious and we have no words related to ‘canine animal’ as ‘person’ and ‘people’ are 
related to ‘human animal’. So the challenge in this case reduces to the insistence that 
those who endorse the transplant intuition must say that there are two thinkers where Fido 
is – and that this is wrong.) 
But, it may be said, the thing that is wrong with my response to the problem of 
too many thinkers is that it creates a mystery. How can a normal healthy adult human 
being, capable of sophisticated first-person thought, not be capable of referring to himself 
in the first-person in such thought when the psychologically indistinguishable person is? 
                                                 
1
 Animalists also need to say something about the reduplication problem. Bernard Williams first posed this 
problem as an objection to psychological continuity accounts of personal identity, in particular, ones that 
certified the intelligibility of reincarnation. But opponents were quick to ask why the objection, if good, did 
not apply equally to his own account of personal identity. Williams never gave a very convincing answer. 
Williams was an animalist or, at least, maintained a position that entailed animalism (though he never 
called himself an animalist, of course). His stated position was that persons were bodies (and he gave 
organisms as examples of bodies), and he certainly did not think that in addition to the bodies that were 
persons there were normal healthy adult human animals that were not persons (and were either not bodies 
or were bodies that were not persons). 
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How can the human animal lack this capacity which its psychologically indistinguishable 
twin possesses? 
But to ask this question is to misunderstand the proposal. The neo-Lockean claim 
is that it can be established by conceptual analysis that the following is a de dicto 
necessary truth: 
Only psychological continuers are objects of first-person thought 
It follows that if A is a human animal, who is in fact not a psychological 
continuer, the following is a de dicto necessary truth: 
If A is not a psychological continuer A’s first-person thoughts are not thoughts 
about A. 
It does not follow, even though A is not in fact a psychological continuer, that the 
following is a necessary truth: 
A’s first-person thoughts are not thoughts about A. 
Nor does it follow that A is necessarily or essentially something whose first-person 
thoughts are not about itself – no de re necessity follows. This is because it is no part of 
the neo-Lockean story that A could not have been a psychological continuer. To say that 
A is not a psychological continuer is to say something about A’s history, and A could 
have had a completely different history.
2
 The sense in which it is established by the neo-
Lockean account that A lacks the capacity to think ‘I’-thoughts about itself is just that, 
qua something which is not a psychological continuer, its ‘I’-thoughts cannot be about 
itself, just as qua someone who never marries, it can never be true of Miss Jones that she 
                                                 
2
 Or not, if a Kripkean argument for the necessity of origin can be defended. In which case there is no 
possible world in which A is a psychological continuer and so A could never have referred to himself in the 
first-person way in thought.But now there is no mystery: this incapacity is explained by the neo-Lockean 
argument for the de dicto necessity of (2), together with the Kripkean argument for the necessity of origin. 
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is a bride, or qua someone who never has been and never will be Prime Minister I cannot 
ever be correctly referred to by the Queen as ‘my first Minister’. 
 Discomfort may remain. According to my version of the neo-Lockean account it 
is not possible for something that is not a psychological continuer to be an object of its 
own first-person thoughts, no matter how sophisticated its thoughts are.
3
 But why, it can 
be asked, should this be so? However, the explanation is simple: to be a psychological 
continuer is to have a certain kind of history: a certain kind of past, present and future. It 
is like being a past and future Prime Minister. But whether something is a thinker now 
and the level of sophistication of its present thoughts cannot depend upon its actual 
future, certainly not its actual future many years hence.
4
  So no matter how sophisticated 
a creature’s present thoughts they cannot ensure that it is a psychological continuer (or a 
future Prime Minister). Consequently, given the neo-Lockean thesis (2), they cannot 
ensure that it is an object of its own first-person thoughts. 
 The proper focus of scepticism about neo-Lockeanism should be on the 
contention that philosophical analyis can identify any persistence conditions at all for – 
any constraints at all on the past and future histories of – objects of first-person reference 
as such.
5
 Why, it can reasonably be asked, is the concept of an object of first-person 
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 Actually, this is also trivially true on Shoemaker’s account, since on that account it is not possible for 
something that is not a psychological continuer to think (first-person thoughts) at all. 
4
 This is the point on which I agree with the animalist and disagree with Shoemaker. Of course, actual 
normal healthy adult human animals differ from psychological continuers in their pasts as well as their 
futures (they have foetal stages). But if we imagine hypothetical beings that are otherwise identical but 
differ from psychological continuers only in their futures (e.g., because they come into existence fully 
formed), Shoemaker would still deny that they were thinkers, because of their differing futures. In fact, he 
would deny that human beings permanently coincident with persons were thinking things (just as he would 
deny that Goliath was Lump). I think the permanently coincident objects are identical and I do not think 
that merely future differences can determine whether something is now a thinker. Hence my agreement 
with the animalist.  
5
 The persistence conditions, or criterion of diachronic identity, for a kind of thing K can be given in the 
form ‘If x is a K then for any times t and t’, if x exists at t and t’ then Rxtt’ and there is no R’ not entailed by 
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reference in this respect not like the concept of something red or something weighing five 
pounds or a rolling, moving thing with size and weight? That is, why can quite different 
kinds of thing with quite different kinds of persistence condition not be objects of first-
person reference (see Noonan 1978: 351)? 
 This is a very good question. The only answer, I think, is the transplant intuition, 
which has to be accommodated. 
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R such that if x is a K then for any times t and t’, if x exists at t and t’ then Rxtt’. Notice that this requires no 
mention of identity. 
